Veyra Finance
Pooled lending with permit-based deposits and flash loans.
A pooled money market on Base. Deposits accept EIP-2612 permits, borrowing is priced from oracle feeds with an L2 sequencer check, and the pool offers flash loans that settle within a single transaction.
- Ecosystem
- Base
- Category
- Lending
- Languages
- Solidity
- Launched
- Dec 2025
Grade BBB · Moderate risk
Adequate posture with notable weaknesses in one or more areas.
+3.0 since Dec 2025 · +0.4 since Jul 2026
Quantix Protocol Research · as of 24 Oct 2026 · About this data
Risk Index
How the score is built
| Component | Weight | Value | Points | Gap |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Code Security | 30% | 76 | 22.8 | −7.2 |
| Operational Security | 20% | 78 | 15.6 | −4.4 |
| Governance Risk | 15% | 80 | 12.0 | −3.0 |
| Economic Security | 15% | 74 | 11.1 | −3.9 |
| Infrastructure Resilience | 10% | 80 | 8.0 | −2.0 |
| Transparency | 10% | 84 | 8.4 | −1.6 |
| Quantix Risk Index | 100% | 77.9 | −22.1 |
| Component | Veyra Finance |
|---|---|
| Code | 76 |
| Operational | 78 |
| Governance | 80 |
| Economic | 74 |
| Infrastructure | 80 |
| Transparency | 84 |
Grade scale
- AAA90–100
- AA85–89.9
- A80–84.9
- BBB75–79.9
- BB70–74.9
- B65–69.9
- CCC60–64.9
- CC55–59.9
- C50–54.9
- D0–49.9
Score history
11 monthly snapshots
| Period | Quantix Risk Index |
|---|---|
| Dec ’25 | 74.9 |
| Jan ’26 | 74.9 |
| Feb ’26 | 77.1 |
| Mar ’26 | 77.1 |
| Apr ’26 | 77.5 |
| May ’26 | 77.5 |
| Jun ’26 | 77.5 |
| Jul ’26 | 77.5 |
| Aug ’26 | 77.5 |
| Sep ’26 | 77.9 |
| Oct ’26 | 77.9 |
22 Sept 2026
Economic
Flash-loan guard
Flash loans pause automatically when feeds disagree.
- Economic Security+3
7 Apr 2026
Infrastructure
Sequencer-aware oracle
Oracle aggregator adds the Base sequencer uptime check.
- Infrastructure Resilience+4
27 Feb 2026
Research assessment
Research assessment completed: Smart Contract Audit
8 findings (2 high, 3 medium, 2 low, 1 informational). All critical and high findings addressed.
Read the research assessment- Code Security+6
- Transparency+4
Risk factors
MediumEconomic SecurityProfile analysis
Flash loans amplify oracle weaknesses
Same-transaction liquidity lets an attacker test any pricing edge at no capital cost, so oracle bounds must hold under adversarial conditions.
MediumEconomic SecurityProfile analysis
Two-feed aggregation
The oracle averages two sources with a 2% deviation guard; if one source fails, liquidations rely on a single feed.
LowCode SecurityFrom the research assessment
1 lower-severity finding not fully resolved
Medium, low or informational findings remain open or partially resolved in the research assessment.
Recommendations
Code Security: 76 → 84
Invariant fuzzing in CI
Run pool-accounting invariants on every change, including flash-loan paths.
+2.4
→ 80.3
Economic Security: 74 → 82
Bound liquidation prices with a TWAP
Reject liquidations when spot and TWAP diverge beyond the deviation guard.
+1.2
→ 79.1
Analysis
Contract, governance and operations
Contract analysis
- Source
- Verified
- Upgradeability
- Transparent proxy
- Administrative control
- Veyra timelock (48 h) with an emergency pause multisig
- Enforced delay
- 48 hours
- External dependencies
- Two aggregated price feeds; Base sequencer uptime feed
- PassSource verified. Pool, receipts, oracle and liquidator verified.
- PassSequencer check. Borrowing pauses during sequencer downtime.
- CautionFlash loans. Flash loans remain available while oracle sources disagree.
- PassPermit deposits. Deposits tolerate front-run permits by falling back to allowance.
Governance exposure
Low
Parameter and upgrade changes pass a 48-hour timelock; an emergency multisig can only pause.
Operational resilience
Adequate
Oracle deviation alerts are in place; liquidation keepers are run by the team and the public.
Monitoring
Monitoring history
- 24 Jun 2026HighPrice deviation of 2.3% after sequencer restartSecurity Alert · PriceOracleResolved
Research assessment
QX-TSA-2026-007Smart Contract AuditPublished
Lending pool, vTokens with permit, price oracle, liquidator and treasury. 1,927 nSLOC of Solidity on Base.
Review 9 Feb 2026 – 27 Feb 2026 · published 24 Mar 2026
- 6 resolved
- 1 partially resolved
- 1 acknowledged
- 0 open
Continue with
- Monitoring timelineRecorded security events for Veyra Finance
- Oracle integrity on an L2 money marketCase study
- Risk Index methodologyWeights, grade bands and calculator
Comparable protocols
- Orrin LendingLending · AvalancheBBB75.5
- Fenwick LendingLending · ArbitrumAA86.9
- Sablewing MarketplaceNFT Marketplace · BaseBBB77.3
Research
Relevant research
- DeFi SecurityUnderstanding oracle manipulation: designs and their failure modes7 min read · 7 Jul 2026
- DeFi SecurityWhat it costs to move a price: reasoning about oracle manipulation7 min read · 11 Aug 2026
- Smart Contract VulnerabilitiesRead-only reentrancy: when a view function tells the truth too early8 min read · 6 Oct 2026
Architecture
System components
- LendingPool
- Deposits, borrows, repayments and flash loans
- vToken
- Interest-bearing deposit receipts
- PriceOracle
- Aggregated price feeds with sequencer-uptime check
- Liquidator
- Liquidation auctions for unhealthy positions
- Treasury
- Reserve factor accrual and withdrawals
Turn risk factors into a remediation plan.
A research assessment traces each weakness to code, configuration or process, and verifies the fix before the score moves.
