Fenwick Lending
Over-collateralised lending with a kinked interest-rate model.
An isolated-market lending protocol deployed on Arbitrum. Each market pairs collateral and debt assets with its own interest-rate curve, liquidation threshold and oracle configuration. Core accounting was formally specified and verified.
- Ecosystem
- Arbitrum
- Category
- Lending
- Languages
- Solidity
- Launched
- Mar 2025
Grade AA · Low risk
Strong posture with minor, documented weaknesses.
+3.4 since Nov 2025 · +2.2 since Jul 2026
Quantix Protocol Research · as of 24 Oct 2026 · About this data
Risk Index
How the score is built
| Component | Weight | Value | Points | Gap |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Code Security | 30% | 90 | 27.0 | −3.0 |
| Operational Security | 20% | 84 | 16.8 | −3.2 |
| Governance Risk | 15% | 86 | 12.9 | −2.1 |
| Economic Security | 15% | 85 | 12.8 | −2.3 |
| Infrastructure Resilience | 10% | 82 | 8.2 | −1.8 |
| Transparency | 10% | 92 | 9.2 | −0.8 |
| Quantix Risk Index | 100% | 86.9 | −13.1 |
| Component | Fenwick Lending |
|---|---|
| Code | 90 |
| Operational | 84 |
| Governance | 86 |
| Economic | 85 |
| Infrastructure | 82 |
| Transparency | 92 |
Grade scale
- AAA90–100
- AA85–89.9
- A80–84.9
- BBB75–79.9
- BB70–74.9
- B65–69.9
- CCC60–64.9
- CC55–59.9
- C50–54.9
- D0–49.9
Score history
12 monthly snapshots
| Period | Quantix Risk Index |
|---|---|
| Nov ’25 | 83.5 |
| Dec ’25 | 84.0 |
| Jan ’26 | 84.0 |
| Feb ’26 | 84.0 |
| Mar ’26 | 84.0 |
| Apr ’26 | 84.4 |
| May ’26 | 84.4 |
| Jun ’26 | 84.7 |
| Jul ’26 | 84.7 |
| Aug ’26 | 84.7 |
| Sep ’26 | 86.9 |
| Oct ’26 | 86.9 |
18 Sept 2026
Research assessment
Research assessment completed: Formal Verification
5 findings (1 high, 2 medium, 1 low, 1 informational). All critical and high findings addressed.
Read the research assessment- Code Security+6
- Transparency+4
15 Jun 2026
Disclosure
Risk framework published
Listing criteria and parameter methodology made public.
- Transparency+3
21 Apr 2026
Infrastructure
Oracle router migrated
Sequencer-aware feeds with staleness checks per market.
- Infrastructure Resilience+4
8 Dec 2025
Economic
Isolated market caps introduced
Per-market supply and borrow caps for long-tail collateral.
- Economic Security+3
Risk factors
MediumEconomic SecurityProfile analysis
Liquidation depth in long-tail markets
Isolated markets limit contagion, but liquidators may not absorb large positions in low-liquidity collateral during fast moves, leaving bad debt in that market.
LowInfrastructure ResilienceProfile analysis
Correlated oracle provider outages
Each market reads two providers; an outage affecting both pauses borrowing protocol-wide on Arbitrum.
Recommendations
Economic Security: 85 → 90
Supply caps scaled to on-chain liquidity
Tie collateral caps to measured DEX depth and refresh them on a schedule.
+0.7
→ 87.6
Infrastructure Resilience: 82 → 88
Independent fallback oracle
Add a third, independently operated feed used only when the primary pair disagrees.
+0.5
→ 87.4
Analysis
Contract, governance and operations
Contract analysis
- Source
- Verified
- Upgradeability
- Transparent proxy
- Administrative control
- Fenwick governance with a 72-hour timelock
- Enforced delay
- 72 hours
- External dependencies
- Two price-feed providers per market; Arbitrum sequencer uptime feed
- PassSource verified. All market contracts verified.
- PassFormal verification. Core accounting properties machine-checked.
- PassSequencer awareness. Borrowing and liquidations pause during sequencer downtime plus a grace period.
- PassUpgrade delay. 72-hour timelock on proxy upgrades.
- CautionLong-tail listings. Governance can list low-liquidity collateral with conservative but nonzero caps.
Governance exposure
Low
Token governance with a 72-hour timelock; market parameters and listings follow a published risk framework.
Operational resilience
Strong
Oracle router fails closed on stale or sequencer-impacted prices; liquidation keepers are permissionless.
Monitoring
Monitoring history
- 24 Oct 2026InformationalLiquidations at 1.8× the usual rateContract Activity · LiquidationEngineResolved
- 19 Jan 2026MediumBorrow of 2.6% of WETH market supplyWhale Activity · MarketCoreResolved
- 3 Dec 2025MediumARB price deviation of 1.4% for two roundsSecurity Alert · OracleRouterResolved
Research assessment
QX-TSA-2026-002Formal VerificationPublished
Core accounting, interest accrual and liquidation engine, verified against 12 specified properties.
Review 31 Aug 2026 – 18 Sept 2026 · published 30 Sept 2026
- 3 resolved
- 0 partially resolved
- 2 acknowledged
- 0 open
Research
Relevant research
- DeFi SecurityUnderstanding oracle manipulation: designs and their failure modes7 min read · 7 Jul 2026
- DeFi SecurityWhat it costs to move a price: reasoning about oracle manipulation7 min read · 11 Aug 2026
- Smart Contract VulnerabilitiesRead-only reentrancy: when a view function tells the truth too early8 min read · 6 Oct 2026
Architecture
System components
- MarketCore
- Supply, borrow, repay and withdraw accounting per market
- InterestRateModel
- Kinked utilisation-based borrow and supply rates
- LiquidationEngine
- Health checks and partial liquidations with close factor
- OracleRouter
- Price feeds with sequencer-uptime and staleness checks
Turn risk factors into a remediation plan.
A research assessment traces each weakness to code, configuration or process, and verifies the fix before the score moves.
