| QX-T01 | Spot-price manipulation of a thin pool | Oracle manipulation | Execution | Large swap on a pool that feeds a price, followed by a borrow or mint in the same transaction | Multi-source or time-weighted prices, deviation bounds, liquidity floors |
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| QX-T02 | Flash-loan funded invariant break | Flash-loan attack | Execution | Flash-loan callback that calls state-changing protocol functions and repays in the same transaction | Invariant checks at the end of entry points, per-block limits |
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| QX-T03 | Share inflation of an empty vault | First-depositor attack | Execution | Direct token donation to a vault with zero or one share before the first real deposit | Virtual shares and decimals offset, seeded initial deposit |
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| QX-T04 | Stale price read during a callback | Read-only reentrancy | Execution | View function of an external pool read while that pool is mid-operation | Check the external reentrancy lock before reading, or avoid manipulable views |
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| QX-T05 | Permit and Permit2 signature phishing | Signature phishing | Execution | Off-chain signatures redeemed by one new spender, then transferFrom sweeps across many holders | Readable typed-data prompts, spender allowlists, revocation tooling |
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| QX-T06 | Cross-domain signature replay | Signature replay | Execution | The same signature or message accepted by a second chain or contract | EIP-712 domain with chainId and verifyingContract, per-signer nonces |
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| QX-T07 | Upgrade through a compromised administrator | Unsafe proxy upgrade | Execution | Upgraded event to an implementation that matches no approved release | Timelocked, multisig-controlled upgrades and implementation monitoring |
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| QX-T08 | Forged or replayed bridge message | Bridge message validation | Execution | Release on the destination without a matching, valid deposit on the source | Proof verification, per-destination nonces, release rate limits |
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| QX-T09 | Borrowed voting power | Governance manipulation | Preparation | Voting power acquired shortly before a proposal that moves treasury funds or roles | Snapshot at proposal creation, timelock, guardian veto |
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| QX-T10 | Frontend dependency injection | Supply chain | Preparation | Changed script hashes, or the interface requesting approvals for a spender it never used before | Subresource integrity, content security policy, build provenance |
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| QX-T11 | Operational signer compromise | Key management | Preparation | Signer activity outside its schedule, or from new infrastructure | Hardware or MPC signing, scoped roles, rate-limited privileges |
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| QX-T12 | Account substitution in a Solana program | Account validation | Execution | Instruction that passes an attacker-owned account where a program-owned one was expected | Owner, signer and seed checks; Anchor account constraints |
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| QX-T13 | Fast dispersal after an exploit | Business logic | Monetisation | Proceeds split into many fresh addresses, swapped and bridged within minutes | Pre-agreed contacts at bridges and venues, rapid tracing |
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